Despite the increasing involvement of interest groups and social movement organizations in the American political system over the past few decades, only recently has some attention been given to understanding how their activities affect political parties. To investigate the relationship between parties and groups, I examine the interactions between the Christian Coalition and the Republican Party. Relying on 17 interviews with national Republican and Christian Coalition officials, and a mail survey of 423 Republican county chairs, I argue that the Christian Coalition has used electoral mobilization and policy expertise more than financial clout to influence the party. These results have important ramifications for the relationship between groups and political parties.
The task of studying social movements and interest groups has been deftly undertaken by numerous political scientists over the past few decades. They have studied group formation, maintenance, influence within the political process and, more recently, their involvement in electoral politics. Scholars have noted that many of these interest groups and social movement organizations seek to influence party nominations, elect favored candidates, influence executive branch appointments, and sway governmental decisions (Cotter et al., 1984: 166; Green, 2000; Green et al., 1998a, b; Hertzke, 1993; Moen, 1992 Moen, , 1997 . Research also has demonstrated that candidates for public office have increasingly relied on social movement and interest group money, volunteers, and ideas to attain office (Bibby, 1996; Herrnson, 1995; Reichley, 1995) .
Although a vast literature on group lobbying and how it influences the voting patterns of members of Congress and state legislators has existed for decades (Achen, 1977; Dexter, 1969; Erikson, 1978; Hansen, 1991; Rubin, 1981, 1982; Kingdon, 1989; McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Wright, 1985) , only recently has some attention been given to understanding how these groups' activities affect political parties. Most of this scholarly work has centered on the direct effect interest groups or social movements have on party candidates and fortunes at the polls (Bednar and Hertzke, 1995; Gilbert, 1995; Green, 1995 Green, , 2001 Green et al., 1993; Guth, 1995; Moen, 1996; Nesmith, 1995; Rozell and Wilcox, 1999; Wilcox et al., 1995 ; but see Bositis, 1988, 1993; Green et al., 1998a; Oldfield, 1996; Schwartz, 1990 Schwartz, , 1994 . As such, little is known about the general linkages between parties and organized groups (Beck, 1974; Coleman, 1996; Frendreis et al., 1996) , and the strategies specific organizations such as labor, abortion groups, the National Rifle Association (NRA), and the religious right use to influence political parties.
In this article, I seek to shed light on the relationship between parties and groups, and the strategies interest groups and social movements use to influence party organizations. Specifically, I examine the relationship enjoyed by the Religious Right and the Republican Party. Of the myriad religious social movement organizations that presently dot the political landscape, the Christian Coalition is an ideal group to study. It remains an important player in GOP politics and often acts like an interest group. Additionally, as noted below, at the time the research was conducted, it was the premier organization of the Christian Right.
Using data drawn from personal interviews, documentary research, and a mail questionnaire of Republican county chairs across the nation, I explore the relationship between the Christian Coalition and the Republican Party. I test three models of influence (electoral mobilization, financial clout, and policy expertise) and find that the ability to mobilize citizens and ideas about public policy matter more than financial clout. I close the article by discussing the ramifications of these results for party-group relations and the representation of citizen interests in democratic political systems.
The Group Organization-Political Party Connection: Three Lenses
Because the changing dynamic between groups and parties is a complex phenomenon, the academic literature has yet to make theoretical and empirical sense of increasing group influence over political parties. Indeed, the evolving relationship between them raises important theoretical issues. First, how do interest groups and social movement organizations influence political parties and what strategies have enabled them to accomplish this goal? Second, what effect has this influence had on the parties? Finally, what implications does the relationship between parties and groups have for American democracy? By examining the Republican Party and the Christian Right, this article seeks to provide initial answers to these questions. Three models can be drawn from the literature on the relationship between parties and groups. Although each of these perspectives primarily has been used to investigate the manner by which groups influence individual members of Congress, the reasoning behind each theory can be used to investigate how a social movement organization employs these resources to sway a political party as a whole.
Electoral Mobilization
The first model used by scholars to explain group influence is electoral mobilization. It argues that social movement organizations secure influence with legislators by assuring them that their supporters will turn out to vote for them on election day (Berry, 1997: 53; Green et al., 1993; Grenzke, 1989: 20; Kingdon, 1989: 157; Oldfield, 1996) . Political parties are in the business of winning elections and modern election campaigns cannot ignore grassroots organization and get-out-the-vote efforts (Canon and Herrnson, 1999: 54; Downs, 1957; Green et al., 1998b) . The electoral mobilization literature recognizes the vital role the ability to mobilize and organize voters plays in party success at the polls, especially given the increasing costs of campaigning and the decreasing loyalties of the electorate (Gibson et al., 1988; Herrnson, 1995: 160; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993: 153; Schier, 2000: 2-3, 24; Wattenberg, 1996) .
A group or movement may recognize this potential for influence and, therefore, aim to deliver the votes of its membership to the party (Oldfield, 1996; Rozell and Wilcox, 1999: 129) , thereby beginning a mutually beneficial relationship. By activating its constituency to help elect party candidates, the organization enables the party to expend its time and resources elsewhere in the electorate and helps it achieve the margins necessary to realize its goal of victory at the polls (Schier, 2000: 8-9 ). Reliably and faithfully providing voters for the party's candidates on election day, the group, on the other hand, gains the party's attention, enabling it to achieve its goal of influencing party policy.
Financial Clout
The second, and most heavily analyzed, of the three influence perspectives centers on financial clout. Proponents argue that by donating money to members of Congress, a group attempts to shape how policy is viewed and the legislation produced (Austen-Smith, 1987; Frendreis and Waterman, 1985; Langbein and Lotwis, 1990) , or at least signal policy preferences to legislators through donations (Austen-Smith, 1995) . 1 If these donations are made almost exclusively to members of a single party, and
they help the party gain or maintain majorities in Congress -or even increase their seat totals -the group's influence with the party may be enhanced.
Moreover, an interest group or social movement organization may influence a political party by either giving contributions to the national party committee and its election arms (Coleman, 1996; Guth and Green, 1990; Magleby and Nelson, 1990) or to candidate campaigns (Goldman, 1996; Kau and Rubin, 1981; Masters and Zardkoobi, 1988; Silberman and Durden, 1976; Wilcox, 2000: 83) . 2 Groups and political action committees (PACs) that make contributions hope to secure access toand, perhaps, influence -the president, top party leaders, and the executive branch (Clawson et al., 1998: 6, 51; Herndon, 1982; Magleby and Nelson, 1990) . As party leaders increasingly depend on these donations to operate in the political world, proponents argue that they are often willing to tinker with their policy goals -or the legislation they seek to achieve those goals -in order to maintain a friendly relationship with the group and ensure that it continues to provide financial resources (Magleby and Holt, 1999) .
Policy Expertise
The last perspective found in the congressional clout literature relies on policy expertise. This literature argues that interest groups and social movement organizations are able to accrue influence with legislators based on their ability to provide them with reliable information about constituents and expertise in certain policy areas (Ainsworth, 1993: 53; Gormley, 1998: 175; Hertzke, 1988: ch. 3; Moen, 1989; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: 6; Smith, 1984: 49; Wilcox, 2000: 91) . 3 As the group builds a reputation for supplying scarce and reliable information, its influence over the policy process will expand because more legislators will approach its lobbyists and policy analysts seeking advice and facts about proposals and expected consequences, and perhaps even legislative agendas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 27; Cobb and Elder, 1983: 174-5; Rochefort and Cobb, 1994; Schattschneider, 1960: 66) .
Similarly, party leaders may rely on these groups to provide them with detailed information and the explanations necessary to make judgments about policy and its impact on constituents. 4 Interest groups and social movement organizations can perform a valuable service; their policy expertise and familiarity with constituent beliefs and interests enables the party to better explain its policy positions to the public and the group's constituency, and thereby help it to win elections. As a group continues to provide these services to the party, over time, the party may begin to rely on its leaders and lobbyists for information about specific issue areas and constituencies. Thus, they begin to accrue -and eventually solidify -influence with the party.
Data and Methods
I chose to investigate the GOP because much less is known about the Republican than the Democratic Party (but see Connelly and Pitney, 1994; Freeman, 1986; Huckshorn and Bibby, 1983; Jones, 1965; Kessel, 1968; Rae, 1989) . The relative paucity of work on the GOP has weakened our ability to understand how parties function and the manner in which they represent citizen viewpoints. Although scholars in recent years have produced more work on the Republican Party, the disparity of knowledge about the internal dynamics within the parties remains.
While many scholars refer to the Christian Right as a social movement (Green et al., 1996; Oldfield, 1996; Wilcox, 2000) , conceptualizing it as composed of many separate interest group organizations provides scholars with a clearer lens through which to view the movement as a whole. Each segment often behaves like any other interest group, lobbying members of Congress of both parties, providing testimony before congressional committees, holding press conferences to disseminate its views to the media and the public, and entering into unusual coalitions (Rozell and Wilcox, 1999) . Additionally, each organization represents different constituencies within the Christian Right and, therefore, emphasizes -or places varying degrees of emphasis on -different issues important to the movement. Thus, each group often approaches the political arena with disparate goals and with varying strategies to influence politics and policy.
The Christian Coalition was selected as the group for this study because it is the best known and, until recently, one of the most influential Christian Right organizations. 5 At the time the research was conducted, it lay at the nexus of the interest group-social movement divide, enabling me to more broadly apply the findings herein. Indeed, although part of a larger social movement, the group had a large membership, a well-seasoned lobbying staff, and large financial resources, providing an excellent test case for all three studied theories of influence.
To thoroughly investigate this relationship, both qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry were used. The interpretive analysis consists of 17 interviews with national Republican and Christian Coalition officials, which enabled preliminary hypotheses about the relationship between the GOP and Christian Right to be developed and tested. These personal interviews provided for a contextually rich assessment of the relationship enjoyed by the group and the party, and allowed for a thorough investigation of the studied group's strategies of influence. These data also provided an opportunity to test whether survey data (described below) fit concrete cases. Finally, they also allowed me to compare the perceptions of local Republican officials with the opinions of national Republican and Christian Coalition leaders.
The quantitative analyses allowed broad theory to be tested over numerous cases. These data consist of a mail survey sent to almost 1700 randomly selected Republican county chairs in all 50 states in July 1999. 6 This sample constitutes half of all county chairs in the country. A followup reminder postcard was sent a month later. The survey was designed to tap these local leaders' perceptions of the Christian Coalition and its perceived influence in their respective areas of the country; the survey responses were representative of the complete population of county chairs. 7 Using the data generated by a survey of 423 Republican county chairs, linear regressions were employed to model how groups attain influence with political parties.
It is important to study elite perceptions about group influence and the effectiveness of group strategies because of the well-known axiom in Washington that perceptions shape reality. How party officials think about group efforts is relevant to questions about interest group and social movement organization influence. If party leaders do not believe particular strategies are effective, it lowers the probability that such tactics actually will be effective. Conversely, if they believe that certain strategies are effective, it increases the probability that such strategies will help the group influence the party. For instance, if party leaders believe that a group that mobilizes citizens to vote helps elect their candidates on election day, that group will probably not only have the attention of party leaders, but be in a position to influence the direction the party takes on issues important to the group and its constituency.
Of course, while it is possible that elites may hide -or at least shadethe truth to benefit their party or maintain social acceptance, it remains important to understand their perspective. My interviews strongly suggest that national GOP and Christian Coalition officials provided realistic assessments of the political world. For instance, interviewers often gave answers that challenged the conventional wisdom and views that are widely held. In other instances, they provided specific observations regarding which groups they thought had the greatest influence.
To study group influence in the Republican Party, from my mail survey, I relied upon two dependent variables: perceptions about Christian Coalition influence in the respondent's county Republican Party, and perceptions about Christian Coalition influence with the county chair's state Republican Party. Specifically, respondents were asked to rank on a 1-7 scale how strongly they felt the 'Christian Coalition has a lot of influence within the Republican Party in my county (and, secondly, state)'. Generated frequencies of the dependent variables reveal that although a clear majority (59 to 34 percent) of respondents believed that the Christian Coalition had little to no influence in their county party organization, a similar majority (52 to 32 percent) stated that the group had influence in their party's state organization.
For measures of perceptions about the three avenues of party influence (policy expertise, electoral mobilization, and financial clout), I relied on the following statements from my survey of Republican county chairs:
1 The Christian Coalition has a lot of influence in the county GOP because of its policy expertise. 2 The Christian Coalition has a lot of influence in the county GOP because of its ability to mobilize voters. 3 The Christian Coalition has a lot of influence in the county GOP because of its financial clout.
Drawing on these measures, I ran several regression models designed to test the direction and magnitude of the relationship between each model and perceptions about Christian Coalition influence in the respondent's county and state Republican Party organizations, respectively. 8 In each regression, I was able to control for a couple of factors that might be relevant to the perception of party influence: whether the county chair also was a Christian Coalition member and the region of the country in which the chair lived. It stands to reason that Republican county chairs who also are members of the Christian Coalition would be more likely to view the group as influential in their county and state parties. This variable was coded as a dummy variable. Regarding region, the southern United States has long been viewed by the political science literature as politically distinct from the rest of the country. Given the South's generally conservative political culture and greater overall number of religious evangelicals and fundamentalists, the region variable was designed as a dummy variable and controlled for the county chair residing in the South. And, indeed, cross-tabulations show that southern county chairs were more likely than their non-southern counterparts to perceive Christian Coalition influence in their county (49 to 25 percent) and state (70 to 41 percent) Republican Parties. Additionally, I examined views about the group's ability to provide various kinds of resources for the party. Specifically, my survey questionnaire asked respondents to rank how well various Christian Coalition activities helped elect Republicans to political office in their county or state. For electoral mobilization, this list of activities included the distribution of Christian Coalition voter guides, voter registration drives, and telephone canvassing two weeks before an election. I studied the financial clout model by asking county chairs how much Christian Coalition financial donations help elect Republicans to political office in their state. 9 Finally, the variables which tapped the policy expertise model asked county chairs whether issuebased advertisements and raising new or reframing policy arguments helped elect GOP candidates. 10 Again, in each of the regressions, I controlled for whether these local party officials held Christian Coalition membership and for region of the country.
Frequencies of these independent variables reveal that pluralities of county chairs found most of these activities to be unhelpful in electing Republicans to office. For instance, strong pluralities believed that group telephone canvassing (44 to 33 percent) and voter registration drives (49 to 28 percent) were generally unhelpful in electing Republican candidates.
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They viewed the group's financial donations unfavorably by a 49 to 30 percent margin. Similarly, by a margin of 47 to 30 percent, they argued that Christian Coalition issue-based advertisements were unhelpful in electing GOP candidates. Finally, while 53 percent of county chairs found the group raising new issues or reframing policy arguments unhelpful, 28 percent believed them helpful. The only exception was the distribution of Christian Coalition voter guides. Regarding this activity, they were split almost evenly (43 to 40 percent against) as to whether it helped elect Republicans to political office.
Personal Interview Results

Electoral Mobilization
Based on the personal interviews I conducted, one way that the Christian Coalition has influenced the Republican Party is by providing it with the votes of its members en masse on election day. This organization has built a constituency and provides it with information that keeps it informed and increases its efficacy. It has informed its followers that participation is part of their Christian civic duty and has tapped into these religious sentiments to ensure activation. This reliable constituency, then, thanks to the work of the Christian Coalition, has provided the GOP with the margins necessary for many victories at the polls.
In 1994, for instance, Evangelical Protestants, the Christian Coalition's primary audience, gave 72 percent of their vote to Republican House candidates and helped the party win majorities of the seats in both the House and Senate for the first time in 40 years. Indeed, Green et al. (1995) estimated that, of the 120 House races in which the Christian Right participated in 1994, they won 55 percent of those campaigns, providing the GOP with the victories necessary to take back the House. Additionally, in 1996, despite a bad Republican year, Evangelicals most likely helped the GOP hold the House by casting 62 percent of their vote for Republican candidates (Abramson et al., 1999: 238) . Finally, in 2000, the closest presidential race in memory, they helped push George W. Bush over the hump to win the presidency; exit polls showed that respondents who self-identified as members of the Christian Right gave 80 percent of their vote to the Republican presidential candidate (ABC News, 2000) .
There is definite recognition by Republican officials that they have been the overwhelming beneficiary of Religious Right voter mobilization activities. Republican National Committee (RNC) Chief-of-Staff Tom Cole noted that Christian Right groups have 'helped us to get from the minority to the majority. They have a huge say in what we do because they participate and are a reliable part of our coalition'. Indeed, Republican officials agreed that the Christian Coalition's ability to mobilize people of faith to participate in the political arena has been key to attaining the clout it has with the GOP. 11 For instance, Cole argued that '[t] he Christian Coalition has considerable influence [because] they produce workers, voters, [and] grassroots support . . . This is where their influence comes from . . . they are a tremendous asset to the party'. 12 Another RNC official supported this view, noting that the group's influence stems directly from its ability to 'motivate [its membership] to participate in the electoral process'. 13 Additionally, RNC Political Director David Israelite argued that the group has 'certainly helped elect Republicans to [various political] offices [around the country]'. 14 A National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) political official agreed, noting that the ability of the Christian Coalition to get its members out to vote has helped Republican candidates in close congressional races win their seats. 15 A 1995 internal survey of its membership supports these views, finding that 98 percent of Christian Coalition adherents had voted in the last three elections, with almost 70 percent identifying as Republicans and only 5 percent as Democrats (Berke, 1995: 18) .
Financial Resources
Furthermore, my personal interview data support the view that the Christian Coalition has not used financial resources to influence the GOP. Although Republican officials acknowledged that financial contributions to the party are important, the evidence presented suggests that they are not necessarily the most efficient means of gaining influence. RNC Chief Cole, for instance, noted that 'just writing checks is very pragmatic'. The writing of a cheque takes very little time and effort and does not demonstrate as much commitment to a party as working hard to get-out-the-vote or canvassing voters to learn what they are thinking about the issues of the day.
According to Margaret Alexander Parker, the RNC's finance director, '[t]he Christian Coalition is not a financial powerhouse for the party . . . They are an army for contacting voters. The grassroots is the key to their power because they motivate their people to vote'. 16 Another RNC finance official put the group's financial power more bluntly, stating that, from a financial perspective, '[t]hey're irrelevant because . . . they don't bring any money to the table'. 17 Former RNC Chairman Haley Barbour agreed, noting that, although they are one of the most powerful groups within the GOP, the Christian Coalition 'has no organized [financial] giving at all'. He, and other GOP officials interviewed, instead cited the group's ability to mobilize its grassroots and its parallel public policy concerns. 18, 19 One may argue that it is hard to believe the Christian Coalition has no financial clout when they have ferociously battled against campaign finance reform. This, however, does not stand to reason. First, and most obviously, one may oppose campaign finance reform on philosophical grounds. Second, laws designed to deal with a specific issue often have unintended or hidden consequences. In its opposition to campaign finance reform, the
Christian Coalition ascribes to each of the above. The group's leaders believe it to be an 'assault on our First Amendment' right to free speech. Indeed, they see it as a hindrance to their ability to educate the voting public about where officials stand on issues important to their conservative constituency, noting that the bill will 'diminish Christian Coalition's ability to distribute voter guides and legislative scorecards'. They also argue that the 'fine print . . . contains language which is so vague and expansive that conservative groups will . . . be at . . . the mercy of some faceless bureaucrat's interpretation of the law' (Christian Coalition's Washington Weekly Review, 2002) . Their opposition, in itself, then, does not connote financial clout.
Policy Expertise
Another way the Christian Coalition has influenced the Republican Party is by providing it and its lawmakers with policy expertise that helps the party produce well-designed policies that attract voters. This organization has used the expertise acquired from in-depth research regarding issues important to its constituency to provide the GOP with information regarding the state of the policy problem and the anticipated effects of the proposed solutions. Moreover, the group's political savvy is evident in that it seeks to help the Republican Party couch issue stances to appeal to not only Christian Coalition members but voters outside of its natural constituency. This relatively pragmatic organization has recognized that the more elections won by the GOP, the better chance it has of meeting the policy goals and the desires of its constituency.
In my personal interviews with high-ranking Republican officials, RNC Chief-of-Staff Cole argued that the Christian Coalition has 'helped define the social issue agenda'. Other RNC officials noted that the group 'is very issue driven' and often 'advocates ideas and messages that benefit the party'. 20 Specifically, former Chairman Barbour cited the Christian Coalition's work on partial-birth abortion as an example of the use of policy expertise to influence the GOP. Group lobbyists provided the party with polling information that showed that, by one or two percentage points, more voters decide whom to vote for based on their pro-life sentiments than do voters who decide based upon pro-choice sentiments. They also noted that their constituents vote overwhelmingly for pro-life candidates. This helped the group encourage many legislators to vote for a ban on the procedure. 21 Chairman Barbour also cited the Christian Coalition's work regarding the GOP's 1997 $500 per child tax credit plan. He noted that pro-family groups had lobbied hard to get it into the Contract with America: the $500 tax credit per child would have been a rate reduction had it not been for the actions of religious conservatives. They wanted it to be a pro-family tax cut and noted that families were paying a higher tax rate than they should be.
The policy expertise they provided, then, proved vital in helping the party think differently about the issue and enabled its eventual inclusion in the Contract. It also helped the GOP attract pro-family voters.
Linear Regression Models
The personal interviews support the prevailing wisdom that the Christian Coalition has used electoral mobilization but not financial resources to influence the Republican Party. However, the finding that policy expertise also is an important source of party influence for the group is surprising. It runs counter to the widely held belief that the group solely possesses zealous issue positions, lacking issue expertise. Similarly, it disputes the notion that Republican leaders are wary of embracing the Christian Coalition's 'controversial' issue appeals in order to attract voters.
Given this surprising result, it is necessary to look at multivariate regression analyses of the mail survey responses to offer more definitive evidence. The first set of linear regression results derived from the Republican county chair survey look at the impact of the three models on perceptions about Christian Coalition influence with the GOP. As shown in Table 1 , even when Christian Coalition membership and residence in the South are controlled, they support the prevailing wisdom that the group's ability to mobilize voters has enabled it to influence the Republican Party. These data show that the level of Christian Coalition electoral mobilization clout explains a large amount of the variation in the group's perceived influence at the county level. This result was statistically significant.
Attaining influence in the county through electoral mobilization is a good predictor of perceiving Christian Coalition influence in the state as well. In this model, the dependent variable is believing that the group has influence with the state Republican Party organization; the independent variables remain the same as in the first model. The model, then, supports the argument that providing voters to the Republican Party is one of the key ways that the Christian Coalition enhances its ability to influence the GOP.
And, as expected, the regression analyses reveal that the group has not used financial resources to attain influence with the GOP. The financial clout independent variable failed to achieve significance in the model used to predict perceived Christian Coalition influence in the county Republican Party. Additionally, while narrowly failing to attain significance, the financial clout variable for the model used to predict perceived group influence in the state party produced a negative beta. These regression results provide very little support for the financial clout model of influence.
In general, however, as Table 1 shows, there is strongest support for the policy expertise model. Although this finding may surprise some observers, it strongly supports the results of the personal interviews. While controlling for Christian Coalition membership and southern residence, each unit increase in believing that the Christian Coalition has influence in the county because of its policy expertise led to a .380 increase in believing that the group has influence in the county GOP. This result was statistically significant at the .001 level. Similarly, attaining influence in the county through policy expertise is a good predictor of perceiving group influence in the state. The model, then, supports the argument that providing policy expertise to the Republican Party is one of the key ways that the Christian Coalition enhances its ability to influence the GOP.
Another set of regressions provide further support for the hypotheses that the Christian Coalition has gained clout in the GOP through its ability to mobilize voters, as well as its ability to inform the party about issues that may help it win electoral contests. These regressions tested more specific formulations of the three models of influence. They employed six electoral strategies as proxies for the independent variables in the first set of regressions. This included the distribution of voter guides, voter registration drives, and telephone canvassing two weeks before an election for voter mobilization. The proxy for the financial clout model asked county chairs how much Christian Coalition financial donations help elect Republicans, while the proxies which tapped policy expertise were running issue-based advertisements and raising new or reframing policy arguments.
Of the six proxy variables used to test the three potential means of influence (Table 2) , when controlling for Christian Coalition membership and southern residence, only one attained significance in the county influence model. It was categorized as a proxy for policy expertise. Specifically, respondents agreeing with the statement that Christian Coalition issue-based advertisements help elect Republicans led to a .211 increase in believing that the group has influence in the party's county organization. However, two proxies for the ability to mobilize voters, specifically the distribution of voter guides and the telephoning of voters before election day, only narrowly missed attaining significance at the .05 level, falling well within the .10 level of significance. Each of the other variables failed to attain significance in the model used to predict Christian Coalition influence.
When controlling for Christian Coalition membership and southern residence, only one of the independent variables in the model designed to predict the organization's influence in the state party achieved significance. This variable served as a proxy for the view that the ability to mobilize voters leads to influence in the GOP. Specifically, the model shows that Republican county chairs believe that the Christian Coalition's ability to register voters contributes to their influence in the state party organization. None of the other independent variables designed to tap electoral mobilization, financial clout, or policy expertise attained significance. The results generated by the proxy models, then, show further support for the electoral mobilization and policy expertise models of influence. While few will be surprised by the findings regarding the Christian Coalition's ability to attain influence through the mobilization of voters, its ability to influence the 487 Source: Republican County Chair Questionnaire, July 1999. a The increase of Christian Coalition influence in the county or state Republican Party for a one-unit increase in X independent variable. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Source: Republican County Chair Questionnaire, July 1999. a The increase of Christian Coalition influence in the county or state Republican Party for a one-unit increase in X independent variable. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Republican Party through policy expertise may surprise some. Indeed, what is perhaps most surprising is that the group's ability to inform the party of policy stances that can be used to win elections is generally a stronger predictor than its ability to mobilize voters to the polls of Christian Coalition influence at both the county and state levels.
Conclusions
In summary, my analysis of perceptions about Christian Coalition tactics toward and influence with the Republican Party show much stronger support for electoral mobilization and policy expertise than financial clout. Although the findings regarding electoral mobilization and financial clout will surprise few scholars, the personal interview and regression results supporting the policy expertise model should surprise most observers. While perhaps not surprised by the findings regarding the group's ability to gain influence through voter mobilization, they are important because, heretofore, there has been little quantitative evidence to support this oftheld view. Similarly, while it is the conventional wisdom in academic and political circles, few scholars have produced evidence to confirm that the Christian Coalition has not attained clout with the party by contributing financial resources to it or its candidate campaigns.
As noted above, many observers will be surprised that the Christian Coalition has been able to influence the party by providing it with policy expertise. Indeed, the data presented show that the group has been able to gain clout with the party by showing it how to make issue appeals which not only attract the group's base but swing voters as well. In short, it has gained influence with the party by showing it how to advance portions of its policy agenda by couching its issue stances in a way that attracts more votes to the GOP. In return, the Christian Coalition benefits from realizing many of its and its constituency's policy goals.
These findings have implications beyond the Christian Coalition and the Republican Party. Contrary to popular hand-wringing over the power of money and financial contributions in American politics, this research suggests ideas and organization matter as well. Although money may at times influence the political process, the data presented above suggest that financial clout is neither the only way, nor the most efficient method, to influence political parties. As such, in thinking about the relationship between parties and groups, as well as more general ramifications for democratic government, these findings suggest that the focus of much of the academic and punditry worlds on campaign finance reform as a way to improve the American electoral process may be misdirected. Much of the debate focuses on the perceived ability of 'special interest' money to influence individual members of Congress, as well as the national parties. Although money is an important part of the group-political party connection, viewing a social
movement's or interest group's relationship with a party solely through financial lenses is only part of the story and may be highly misleading. The ability to mobilize citizens and ideas about policy matter as well.
For those worried about the power of special interest groups and social movement organizations, such as labor, environmentalists, business, and the NRA, my research suggests money is not the only (or best) means of securing influence. Congress needs to explore other avenues of reform and determine what role interest groups and other 'special interests' should play in the political process before they can hope to truly remedy the representational fallacies of the American electoral system. Other remedies include, but are not limited to, providing incentives for voting, curtailing the ability of groups to run issue-based advertisements, disclosing the kind of information lobbyists provide to Congress, and providing free television time for candidate campaign commercials.
Of course, this article only studies one group and there may be something peculiar about religious groups and religious motivations which make the Christian Coalition's emphasis on ideas somewhat unique. However, there appear to be strong parallels with other organizations. For instance, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) relationship with the Democratic Party and Big Labor's and the NRA's recent renewed emphases on voter mobilization are noteworthy. Many of these groups are putting as much effort into the ground war as the air war. Nonetheless, before broad conclusions can be drawn with reasonable certainty, avenues of group influence need to be studied in greater detail. In order to completely understand what role organization, money, and ideas play in the relationship between political parties and interest groups and/or social movements, scholars need to examine the strategies used by other groups such as the National Federation of Independent Businesses and the NRA to influence the GOP and the tactics used by environmental groups and labor to influence the Democratic Party.
Finally, researchers need to investigate why some groups are successful on some but not other issues. For example, why has the Christian Right been successful at influencing the GOP on abortion and tax cuts but not trade policy with China? Studying the strategies used by business interests to influence the party might help shed some light on this matter. More research is needed in this area before we can completely understand how social movement organizations and interest groups secure influence with political parties, and then determine what effect that influence has on the ability of parties to represent citizen interests.
Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Darrell West, Roger Cobb, Wendy Schiller, Clyde Wilcox, Geoff Layman, John Green, Howard Reiter, Bryan McGraw, Matt Moen, Laurel Elder, and Alan Zuckerman on earlier versions of this article, as well as the helpful comments of the editor of this journal and two anonymous reviewers. Any errors that remain are solely those of the author.
1 Contrary to the findings of many of the pro-financial clout scholars listed in the body of the text, others have argued that factors such as party affiliation, district union membership, ideology, district presidential vote, and constituency demographics supersede -or at least have equal weight -in the vote decision calculus of members of Congress (Chin et al., 2000; Grenzke, 1989; Grier and Munger, 1993: 620; Wawro, 2001: 576; Wilhite and Theilmann, 1987; Wright, 1990: 434) . And Rozell and Wilcox (1999: 102) find that contributions to parties are not usually meant to influence ideological positions. 2 Through the 2002 elections, these contributions may take the form of either soft or hard money donations. The former consist of unlimited, though legally disclosed, contributions while the latter are subject to contribution limits. Until McCain-Feingold goes into effect after the 2002 elections, there is no legal limit imposed concerning how much 'soft money' can be given. Although federal law requires disclosure of these contributions, unlike hard money, they are not lineitem reported at the federal level. Therefore, it is easier for parties to hide contribution amounts, contributor names, and how the soft money is spent; all of this limits public accountability of party activities (Holt, 2000; Magleby, 2000) . 3 Many, including West and Loomis (1999) , argue that groups need financial resources to undertake the activities necessary to influence the political process. This article, however, studies the strategies groups use to accrue influence with political parties, not the resources necessary to implement those strategies. It is not interested in how they raise money, how they organize get-out-the-vote drives, or how they gather information. It is concerned with whether they use money, voter mobilization, policy expertise, or some combination thereof, to influence political parties. 4 Lobbyists and group leaders have strong incentives to shade the truth to their advantage (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Wright, 1996: 4) . However, a group whose lobbyists and leaders operate in a less than forthright manner may suffer dramatic political consequences when the total truth comes to light (see Himelfarb, 1995: especially 54-6 and 72-3) . Lobbyists are very aware of how important their reputations for honesty and candor are (Ainsworth, 1993: 53; Berry, 1997: 98; Schier, 2000: 160) and the presence of opposing groups further prohibits them from 'exploiting the informational advantages they often have over legislators' (Wright, 1996: 190) and party leaders. Credibility and trustworthiness, then, are the keys to influence obtained through policy expertise (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: 103) . 5 Another conservative Christian organization, the Family Research Council (FRC), also was examined as part of a larger project looking at attempts by groups to influence the Republican Party. Similar results were found between the strategies used by the Christian Coalition and by FRC. Both groups were cited for their policy expertise, as well as their ability to mobilize voters for conservative candidates. Although this revelation is pertinent to the subject under study in this article, the FRC findings are not included in this article because they are solely qualitative data gleaned from personal interviews with national actors. 6 The Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island Republican Parties do not have county chairs. As such, I surveyed Republican town chairs in these three states. Similarly, the Alaska and North Dakota GOP do not employ county chairs as part of their hierarchy; instead, each uses district chairs, who I surveyed in lieu of county chairs. Delaware and Minnesota also were exceptions to the survey process. Since Delaware is a relatively small state, with only three counties, the Delaware GOP delegates authority to county chairs in Kent and Sussex Counties but breaks up New Castle County into five 'regional chairs', all of whom were included in the survey. Additionally, I was unable to attain the names and addresses of county chairs from the Minnesota State Republican Party. Thus, I surveyed the congressional district chairs in lieu of the county chairs. And, of course, in the great state of Louisiana, Republican parish chairs were surveyed. 7 A little over 25 percent of, or over 400, county chairs responded to the survey.
Nineteen percent of those returned came from the Northeast, 6 percent from Pacific Coast states, 29 percent from the Midwest, 37 percent from the South, and 9 percent were returned by Mountain West Republican county chairs. Although the sample is weighted toward the South and Midwest, this strongly reflects the population of Republican county chairs. Indeed, when the response rate is examined by region, one finds that over 20 percent of northeasterners replied, 29 percent of Pacific Coast county chairs responded, and over 25 percent of midwesterners, southerners, and county chairs from the Mountain West answered the survey. The response rate, then, was relatively even among regions. 8 The independent variables are moderately correlated, with the level of significance for each at .01. For instance, using Kendall's tau-b, the policy expertise and financial clout variables have a correlation coefficient of .473, the mobilization and policy expertise variables have a coefficient of .444, and the mobilization and financial clout variables have a coefficient of .356. Although this raises some issue of multicollinearity, my personal interviews support the view that the Christian Coalition used both electoral mobilization and policy expertise to influence the Republican Party. 9 The independent variables are moderately to strongly correlated, with the level of significance for each at .01. For instance, using Kendall's tau-b, the distribution of voter guides and the telephone canvassing variables have a correlation coefficient of .618, whereas the financial donations and raises new issues or reframes policy arguments variables have a correlation coefficient of .445. However, the personal interviews strongly support the view that electoral mobilization and policy expertise have been used by the Christian Coalition to influence the GOP. 10 One may argue that, in addition to providing parties with information about issues and the desires of their electoral constituencies, issue ads also are designed to mobilize voters. Bivariate correlations, however, reveal a stronger association between believing that issue ads help the Christian Coalition attain influence and policy expertise than the ability to mobilize voters. 11 Each Republican official interviewed observed that the Christian Coalition is an important part of the GOP's electoral coalition. However, they are only one facet of the Republican coalition, which includes, but is not limited to, small business owners, trade organizations, much of Corporate America, strong national defense proponents, veterans, gun owners, other conservative social interest groups, anti-tax groups, and libertarians and other small government proponents. 
